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I. Introduction. The United States does
not have a coordinated or articulated
maritime policy sufficient to cope with
the fundamental changes taking place in
the strategic environment. Unless we
make certain critical decisions concerning the nature and direction of this
policy for the next decade, we may find
our international position severely
eroded. For, although we are on the
threshold of a potential renaissance in
maritime affairs, the debate over U.S.
policy has been couched almost entirely
in terms of the U.S.-Soviet naval balance, which, although of great importance, cannot be fully understood
except in the context of the broader
maritime issues reflecting the growing
relationship between the sea and
society.2

The sea is in the ascendancy as a
source of vital resources, for transportation of goods and services and as a
medium for projecting and deploying
military force. Yet, if the words
"chaos" and "disorder" do not fully
describe the existing condition of world
maritime affairs, there are indications
they soon will.
On the international level, the fifth
United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS) ended in New
York in September 1976. With the
failure to resolve the major issues relevant to establishing an acceptable regime for regulating navigational and
commercial exploitation of the oceans,
the possibilities for political and even
military conflict over the uses of the
seas have increased. Within the Western
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alliance, as elsewhere, the competition
for ocean resources has exacerbated
existing tensions over fish in the North
Atlantic, oil in the Aegean and North
Seas and sovereignty over numerous
small islands located throughout the
world's seaways. In the United States,
complex financial and bureaucratic pressures restrain and retard attempts to
establish maritime policy. Quantum increases in unit costs of all U.S. naval
forces have contributed to substantially
reduced overall force levels, the lowest
since the end of World War II, and the
cost overruns of several of the U.S.
Navy's shipbuilding programs could conceivably cause a legal showdown between the Department of Defense and
two major civilian construction firms*
which, in turn, could jeopardize current
and projected Navy shipbuilding programs. This comes on top of an already
foundering U.S. merchant marine
building program. (Similarly, primary
naval aircraft manufacturers, such as
Grumman and Lockheed, are experiencing financial difficulties.)
On the more specific question of
U.S. military power, during most of the
post-World War II era, the United States
and its allies, especially Britain and
France, have controlled virtually all
major oceans and waterways of the
world. This was regarded as an important adjunct of the policy of "containment" and was, in part, a reaction
to the land threat posed to Eurasia by
the Soviet Union and China and the
maritime threat posed by the Soviet
submarine force which, in turn, was
seen as analogous to the U-boat peril of
World Wars I and II. This worldwide
deployment was also due to the historical legacy which gave the United States,
Britain and France numerous base rights
*While the Navy appears to have reconciled claims with Newport News Shipyard,
substantial difficulties remain with Litton and
recently with Electric Boat in Groton,
Connecticut.

in overseas territories adjacent to critical
sealanes and waterways. One effect of
this legacy was to assume that we had
ready and unchallenged access to distant
places. Thus, during the entire U.S.
involvement in Vietnam, there was no
serious public debate or worry over the
sea and air lines of communication.
However, during the October 1973
Arab-Israeli War which lasted for 3
weeks, the security of our lines of
communication was threatened by nonmilitary acts which included the denial
of many NATO European bases to our
mobility forces. Since 1973 further
erosion of base rights in the Pacific and
Atlantic pose growing constraints on
our overseas presence at the very time
our dependency upon maritime access is
increasing. This comes concurrently
with the proliferation of advanced
weapons technology to many littoral
states which now possess military capabilities sufficient to give the superpowers at least second thoughts about
the projection of their own military
power.
The broad changes in the international maritime environment (Law of
the Sea, conflict over sea resources,
changes in shipbuilding programs, access
to overseas bases) also cut across many
domestic bureaucratic lines. We believe
that a comprehensive review of U.S.
policy requires that the maritime interests of government institutions other
than the U.S. Navy be more fully
considered and understood, (including
the U.S. Air Force, Army and Marine
Corps and civilian agencies such as the
Departments of Commerce, Interior,
Labor, State and Transportation) and
must be balanced with the maritime
interests of the private sector.
Thus, on almost every level of maritime activity, the problems of policy
formulation and successful implementation have become increasingly complex
and less prone to solution. However,
none of these problems is insolvable.
The U.S. Government still has sufficient
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flexibility and scope to determine the
nature and direction of maritime policy.
Because the emerging environment is
much more complex than the postWorld War II era we must undertake a
careful analysis of the interaction between all maritime activities and interests before reaching conclusions on
the preferred size, capabilities and deployment of the fleet, as well as on
other aspects of our maritime policy,
including the commercial exploitation
of the seas, the continued development
of advanced technology and those
political commitments which require us
to maintain an overseas basing structure.
We propose first to review the current debate concerning U.S.-Soviet naval
rivalry and examine the evolution of
U.S. and Soviet naval forces. Second, we
will examine the major strategic changes
and their impact on the ocean environment and, third, we will suggest several
policy options for the United States
which can exploit the new emerging
maritime order.
II. U_S.-Soviet Maritime Competition_
In order to appreciate the nuances of
the current debate over the magnitude
and meaning of the U.S.-Soviet maritime rivalry, it is first necessary to
consider briefly the uses of naval power
and the evolution of the U.S. and Soviet
navies.
Evolution of Navies. Traditionally,
navies have been constructed for one or
more of three related purposes: to
project power; to defend or deter
against maritime threats; and to serve
political and ideological interests. 3 The
first set of purposes has led to traditional uses which concentrated on
achieving "mastery" or "command" of
the sea by the decisive victory of "capital ships" against the capital ships of an
adversary in main force actions. Navies
achieving "command" of the sea in this
manner could, de facto, have served the
purposes of the other two categories.

The second purpose focused upon
"denying" and deterring an adversary's
use of the sea. Smaller, numerically
inferior navies tended towards this category relying more on commerce raiding
(guerre de course) in which main force
actions were to be avoided. This "defensive" use of naval power dates from the
days of oar, sail and piracy to Hitler's
attempt to cut off Britain's maritime
lifelines during World War II. Likewise,
the deterrent qualities of navies,
described by Mahan as the concept of a
"fleet-in-being," have led to roles such
as that played by the German High Seas
Fleet before the Battle of Jutland
which, without major actions, restrained
the Royal Navy from wide·ranging
operations outside the North Sea simply
by virtue of a threatened sortie.
The political and ideological uses of
navies are more difficult to comprehend
and analyze because measurement of
these perceptions is often imprecise.
The flottenpolitik nature of navies includes an indeterminate mixture of awe,
will, credibility, uncertainty and, perhaps most critically, the subjective perceptions of adversaries and potential
victims. In an historical sense, political
and ideological determinants have had
two major results. First, commitment or
interest has been demonstrated by the
presence of naval ships and, more precisely, the naval ensign representing the
power of the state. To be credible,
however, it was essential that sufficient
force would be applied against an adversary even if reprisals were delivered well
after the offending act.
A second result, indeed almost a
corollary of the first, focused more on
the ideological purposes behind naval
development, namely that states
acquired navies, in part, for reasons of
prestige, influence, as part of great
power status or due to a pervasive and
demanding ideology. Today, the
ascendancy of the Soviet Navy to naval
superpower status, has led some Western
observers to refer to the political and,
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perhaps, ideological roles of the Soviet
Navy which include "securing prestige
and influence." Taken together, these
three purposes have produced primary
naval missions of: projection of power;
sea control; sea denial; presence and
deterrence.
Not until the late 1960's when a
strategic nuclear standoff and political
"parity" emerged between the two
superpowers did the distinctions separating these traditional missions become
blurred and artificial on two levels.
First, while great navies once had classical projective purposes, in the nuclear
age, the overarching concern of escalation into general war seemed to limit
the extent of these possible uses for one
superpower navy directly against the
other. Second, new technology in the
form of ballistic and cruise missiles
and/or nuclear warheads has provided
for once numerically inferior navies
extraordinary destructive capabilities.
Thus, these navies, which originally had
only defensive or denial functions and
were relatively ineffective in imposing
their will upon an adversary (and, by
extension, on his capital ships), now
must be more fully reckoned with on
both the strategic nuclear and conventional scales. For example, the small
sea-based nuclear deterrent forces of
Britain and France are of far greater
concern to the Soviet Union than all
their remaining naval forces because of
the damage which could be inflicted
against Russian cities by British and/or
French submarine-launched ballistic
missiles.4 On the conventional level,
missile-equipped fast patrol boats, submarines and aircraft, under certain tactical conditions of geography and surprise
are capable of denying local sea areas to
traditional "dreadnoughts" of superpower navies and can therefore be regarded as "ersatz" capital ships. The
concept that only a dreadnought can
defeat a dreadnought has been dramatically altered by technology.
The increased destructive capabilities

of modern navies, large or small, have
caused us to modify "traditional" thinking about roles and uses of naval forces.
However, against this background of the
increasing diffusion of power and increasing dependence upon the sea, what
is indicated is not a decline in the utility
of navies, but rather, a requirement for
a broader reassessment of policy including all of these factors.
Evolution of the U.S. Navy. Since
the 1890's, the U.S. Navy has acquired a
projective outlook on naval power based
on controlling the seas. Although the
United States has become increasingly
dependent upon maritime commerce
and has faced adversaries equipped with
"capital ships," the United States has
also been protected and isolated by the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and has had
a happy history of nearly always being
able to exercise "command of the sea"
in this century.
The outset of the cold war required
U.S. military forces capable of sup·
porting alliances designed to contain
Soviet expansion. During the late 1940's
and early 1950's, the primary U.S.
concern was the defense of Western
Europe. This gave continued importance
to protecting North Atlantic sea lines of
communications (SLOC's). During this
period the aircraft carrier task force was
(and still is) the centerpiece in carrying
out the bulk of U.S. sea control and
power projection missions as well as
determining much of force structure
and force levels despite the advent of
the Polaris submarine system (SSBN).
Based on these factors and the
carriers' absolute domination of the seas
during World War II, Korea and Viet·
nam, and because of the inherent flexi·
bility and mobility of the Navy, U.S.
national strategies of "massive retaliation," "flexible response" and the
"Nixon Doctrine" have not basically
changed U.S. naval missions although
they are more precisely articulated
today. U.S. Chief of Naval Operations,
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Adm. James L. Holloway III, USN, has
defined two basic functions: sea control
and power projection. The 13 attack
aircraft carriers (CV's) along with the
attack submarines (SSN's), maritime
air and surface ships form the substance
of sea control Power projection is a
more subtle function ranging from nuclear deterrence and the SSBN's,
through the amphibious forces and their
projective capability, to conventional
bombardment of the shore by aircraft
and ships down to peaceful presence.
However, all these examples of power
projection emphasize the need, first, to
establish some form of sea control
The Evolution of the Soviet Navy.
The Soviet Navy developed from very
different historical, geographical, and
institutional frames of reference than
the U.S. Navy. For five decades since
the October Revolution in 1917, the
U.S.S.R. has perceived itself as strategically inferior to its major Western
adversaries. After the Second World
War, Stalin set the requirements for a
naval "active defense" based on fast
cruiser strike groups and submarines
operating in support of the Red Army's
maritime flanks against invasion.s The
mission of protecting the Russian homeland, fashioned by centuries of insecurity bordering on paranoia has been
one of the most significant differences
in outlook between U.S. and Soviet
naval developments.
As the Soviet perception of the
threat adjusted to the U.S. massive
retaliation doctrine and the possibility
of global nuclear war, the impact of a
U.S. nuclear attack launched from aircraft carriers began to occupy a higher
naval priority than the traditional support mission. By the late 1950's, the
Soviet military establishment had
adapted, in part, to these nuclear factors
and the navy's primary missions were to
sink Western aircraft carriers prior to
their launching strategic nuclear attacks
against the U.S.S.R. and to defend

against invasion. However, this new
"antinuclear" mission required nearly
continuous naval presence within
striking distance of U.S. carriers, hence
some form of forward naval deployment
now became necessary.
The evolution of U.S. ballistic missile
submarines and their deployment in late
1960 had further dramatic impact on
Soviet naval planning and, by the early
1960's, decisions had been implemented
which included the requirement for
hunting and, presumably, destroying
"Polaris" SSBN's. This task, which some
observers feel the Soviet naval leadership grossly underestimated, was to be
accomplished by a "balanced" force
consisting of submarines, missileequipped long·range aviation and surface ships.
This approach to doctrine and force
planning fundamentally differed from
that followed in the United States in
that the Soviet view assumes not only
that nuclear deterrence can fail but that
its failure must serve as a rationalization
for force levels. This appears to remain
central to Soviet military thought. However, in parallel to the development of
strategic sea-denial capabilities, the
Soviet Union has partially mirrored the
U.S. Navy in deploying its fleet of
SSBN's certainly for strategic deterrent
purposes and, in part, for "war fighting"
if deterrence fails. Thus, the strategic
nuclear criteria of defense against
Polaris and the aircraft carrier and of
maintaining a nuclear deterrent capability continue as the bedrock of Soviet
naval missions. However, in order to
oppose "Polaris," forward deployment
of naval forces, overseas basing and
overseas presence are continuous requirements more rigorous than those
needed only for opposing the carrier. 6
It is these factors, among others, that
undoubtedly increased the importance
of Soviet missions ranging on the more
"peaceful" side of the violence spectrum and are incorporated under the
general heading of peacetime presence,
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missions over which the West has always
demonstrated a certain sensitivity and
missions which the Soviets show little
intention of decreasing.

more conventional forms of sea denial
and interdiction short of global war is
especially relevant because of the improbability and disutility of thermonuclear war including the great difficulty in hunting Polaris, the growing
importance of the oceans, and the questioning of Western resolve by the West
and perhaps by the Soviet Union. It is
also on this point which Western analysis divides its opinion about Soviet naval
intentions.

Summary of Differences. A comparison of the missions of both navies, as
explicitly stated by their senior admirals
underscoring the different outlooks, is
shown in table l.
On the one hand, the United States,
by virtue of geography, requires a longrange capability for projection of conventional force. 7 The Soviets, so far,
have been more concerned with the
immediate and proximate defense of
their homeland, requiring counterpower
projection against invasion and denying
the adversary wartime use of his strategic weapons in addition to participating in nuclear attack. But, the virtues
of peacetime presence, which the
Soviets see as potentially "neutralizing"
U.S. presence are real and are unlikely
to be reduced in the future.
Given this bifurcation of Soviet naval
mission between criteria of strategic
nuclear war and peacetime presence, the
notion of Soviet naval use spilling over
from strategic nuclear sea denial to

The Debate over Soviet Maritime
Power. Western analysts agree that since
Stalin's day there has been unprecedented growth in the qualitative capabilities and overseas presence of Soviet
maritime power. Beyond this point,
there is little consensus. There is a
debate over the Soviet Navy because of
uncertainty about Soviet motives, likely
actions and capabilities. This debate has
been sometimes skewed by "mirror
imagery" and "worse case" or "vulnerability" analysis. Mirror imagery is the
tendency to view Soviet responses to
these issues as we do, i.e., in Western
terms.\ "Vulnerability" or "worse case"
analysis is determining what the most

UNITED STATES (Holloway, 1976)

SOVIET UNION (Gorshkov, 1976)

Sea control (conventional)

Strategic sea denial (anti-SSBN,
anti-CV); limited conventional
sea denial

Power projection
a. Nuclear deterrence

Participating in strategic nuclear
attacks

b. Amphibious projection

Defending maritime flanks (areas
immediately adjacent to U.S.S.R.,
such as the Northern Flank, the
Danish Straits, and the
Dardanelles)

c. Conventional (shore bombardment, blockade)

Protection of fleet operating areas

d. Presence

Protecting state interests, securing
"prestige and influence"
Table 1
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dangerous contingency would be for the
West without necessarily assessing the
likelihood or probability of its occurrence and using that as a planning
assumption. Taken together, these factors can obscure the real significance
and meaning of Soviet maritime power
and make accurate analysis difficult
both on the level of Soviet operational
capabilities and on the more critical
plane of Soviet motives.
Despite a great deal of data, there is
also substantial disagreement over the
actual capabilities of Soviet maritime
power. For example, while the Kiev
class air-capable ship is described by the
Soviets as being an "ASW cruiser," some
Western analysts see her use as potentially oriented towards conventional
projection of naval force against either
other surface navies or the shore.8 The
"Y" and "D" class nuclear submarines
are generally regarded in the West as
only second-strike retaliatory systems,
similar to our SSBN's but some observers suggest they have (or will have)
counterforce capabilities beyond that
role. 9 Does Soviet interest in overseas
bases like Berbera in the Indian Ocean
and West Africa indicate a legitimate
naval requirement, attempts at expanding influence or both? What can be
decided about Soviet trends in naval
procurement-do they indicate longer
term expansionary objectives or are
they just sufficient to maintain current
force levels?
Most important, however, is the
debate over interpretation of Soviet
maritime power in the context of Soviet
political strategy and its intentions.
How will and how can the Soviet Navy
be used? For example, many Western
analysts argue that the expansion of the
Soviet Navy, in qualitative and operational measures, provides the capability
for conventional sea denial and, hence,
the naval power for threatening vulnerable Western maritime lines of communication such as the North Atlantic
and the oil routes from the Persian Gulf

which are critically important in time of
both war and peace. Therefore, one
primary U.S. naval response must be
protecting these SLOC's. However, since
the most usual scenario offered entails a
protracted war at sea, which appears
unlikely, these assumptions and the
corresponding naval requirements and
costs can be questioned even though the
perceived vulnerability of SLOC's remains.
Alternatively, the Soviets describe
"sea denial," at least for the present, in
terms of strategic nuclear defense aimed
against Western ballistic missile submarines (SSBN's) and nuclear-capable
attack aircraft carriers (CV's). Thus, a
major issue over which debate exists is
the scope of Soviet sea denial and the
relevance of severing SLOC's. Does
Soviet sea denial consist only of the
strategic nuclear defensive; does it include conventional uses short of general
nuclear war or does the Soviet naval
view incorporate both elements?! 0
The "expansionist" trends in the
Soviet Navy are challenged by some
observers who, in reviewing all available
evidence in the form of Soviet shipbuilding programs (including aircraft
and submarines),!! explicit doctrine,
public pronouncements, training exercises and deployment patterns argue
that while the more conventional
aspects of sea denial may one day
replace the difficult, if not impossible,
task of countering Polaris and Trident,
at this stage what has been considered
reliable evidence in the past still continues substantiating the missions outlined by Gorshkov.
The dilemma here, of course, is
resolving what may be genuinely defensive Soviet intentions with increasingly
offensive capabilities. And, since debate
over the Soviet Navy seems to be
ongoing in the Soviet Union as well as in
the West, particularly Admiral Gorshkov's prolific arguments! 2 for a broader
approach to naval use, dismissing out of
hand either argument would be
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erroneous. Western analysts should,
therefore, focus on certain indicators or
pulses of Soviet action which may be
helpful in resolving this issue. These
"vital signs" include:
a. The Soviet debate over naval doctrine.
b. New Soviet building construction
programs and weapons systems.
c. Change in Soviet deployment patterns, overseas basing, exercises.
d. Development in Soviet conventional ground and air force capabilities
especially with respect to air, sealift and
amphibious forces.
e. Soviet perceptions of Western
political and military resolve.
The results of monitoring these vital
signs will inevitably be ambiguous in
part. However, if in the main, the
strategic nuclear criteria continue as
doctrinal requirements and are paralleled by complementary building progtams and deployment patterns, the
conclusion would not support the "expansionist," anti-SLOe argument. A
diminution of the strategic nuclear defensive mission and the acquisition of
more forces capable of projective power
such as attack carrier aircraft (including
radically new VSTOL's), blue-water
amphibious and logistic squadrons and
more extensive basing rights would tend
toward confirming a fundamental
change in Soviet Navy missions away
from its current wartime role.
Thus, deduction of Soviet naval
missions is both possible and important.
However, what is missing from the
general debate over Soviet motives and
appropriate Western responses is any
explicit linkage between those purely
naval responses to Soviet naval power
and broader maritime options which are
present in the emerging maritime environment. This is indeed paradoxical
because the evolution of both navies has
been affected differently by the broader
reach of history and environment and
every indication suggests the future will
be similar to the past in that respect. If

that is correct, what needs to be done,
as well, is to interpret the respective
roles, missions and capabilities of each
navy in terms ot the maritime environment, and to assess the major asymmetries of U.S. and Soviet maritime
vulnerabilities and dependencies in this
broader context.
III. The Diffusion of Power and the
U.S.-Soviet Maritime Environment. The
diffusion of power is having a major
impact upon both U.S. and Soviet maritime power at three levels of analysis:
political, military, and economic.
Political Impacts. The proliferation
of the number of sovereign states within
the international system is having important political effects upon the flexibility of the major maritime powers to
project military and all forms of economic and political power across the
globe. In practical terms the large numbers of nonaligned states can now influence U.N. votes on Law of the Sea
questions, so much so that on certain
issues such as freedom of navigation
through narrow straits, the United
States and the Soviet Union have frequently demonstrated complementary
minority interests.
The overall effect of this phenomenon appears to put increasing political constraints on the deployment
and use of naval power by the United
States and Soviet Union in strategic
regions of the world. This is not to say
that if either superpower felt its vital
interests were seriously threatened it
could not act unilaterally and use its
naval power to uphold them. However,
in lesser situations, the political and
possibly military costs of using naval
power against the wishes of local states
have risen to the point where shows of
force such as the U.S. deployment of
the Enterprise Task Force through the
Strait of Malacca into the Bay of
Bengal in 1971 during the Indo-Pakistan
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War may become more problematic in
the future.
The net effect of these political
constraints should make the superpowers increasingly wary about how
they deploy their navies and how they
weigh the costs and benefits of doing so.
Military Effects
• Nuclear Weapons. In weighing
the military implications of the new
environment upon the United States
and the Soviet Union, the role of
nuclear weapons remains the most critical ingredient. Since both countries have
placed great reliance upon the nuclear
submarine equipped with ballistic missiles, any changes in the environment to
enhance or diminish the survivability
and vulnerability of these systems will
be regarded with the utmost concern. In
this instance, both countries are now
deploying missiles with sufficiently long
ranges to permit them to be deployed
near home ports respectively in the
United States and the Soviet Union.
But, for example, the sea area between
the North Cape of Norway and the
Svalbard (Spitzbergen) is believed to be
rich in oil, is certainly rich in fish and is
claimed by Norway. The Soviet Union
considers this passageway as vital to its
security since the bulk of the Soviet
submarine fleet is located at Murmansk.
If Norway or an international consortium were to "develop" the oilfields
in a similar manner to the existing
North Sea oilfields south of 62° N.
latitude, the potential vulnerabilities of
Soviet submarines and their bases would
be increased because of the proximity
of Western oil rigs and oceanographic
research facilities which, certainly in the
Soviet view, could have military implications.
Similarly the potential spread of
nuclear weapons may pose as great if
not greater problems for Soviet security
than for the United States and its allies.
The list of existing and potential nth

nuclear powers indicates that most of
them are more likely to be able to
threaten the Soviet Union than the
United States. Already Britain and
France have SSBN's capable of targeting
the Soviet Union. With the exception of
Brazil, most of the other likely nuclear
powers are located much closer to
Soviet than to U.S. continental targets
(Israel, India, Iran, South Africa,
Republic of Korea, Republic of China).
• Access to Overseas Military
Facilities. In contrast to nuclear issues
where the U.S.S.R. may be most vulnerable, the United States will be more
constrained if, as seems likely, it is
further denied access to overseas naval
facilities which are politically costly and
are subject to the vagaries of the host
country. The Soviet Union has a certain
dependence on external naval facilities
but has adopted austere operations
using alternatives such as accomplishing
necessary repairs and maintenance at
anchor rather than at shore bases. However, without access to overseas bases,
the United States cannot carry out all
existing missions and may be forced to
accept certain restraints in operational
capabilities. The alternatives of designing forces and force levels not requiring overseas basing are extremely
costly. Overseas bases, on the other
hand, are not essential for current
Soviet missions but could be a great
bonus for future missions.
• Proliferation of Arms and the
Closure of the Seas. More and more
countries are procuring military technologies capable, in theory, of challenging the maritime forces of both the
United States and the Soviet Union in
local environments. The spread of cruise
missiles, maritime strike aircraft, submarines and mines to less-industrial
states means that they now have much
more effective local "sea denial" options than were available in the past.
These capabilities, together with the
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extension of territorial waters out to at
least 12 miles and exclusive economic
zones (EEZ's) out to 200 miles
strengthen the argument that increasing
areas of the world's sea space may be
effectively "closed" thereby eroding the
maritime powers' "freedom of the
seas." However, those less-industrial
countries most heavily committed to a
military buildup are not reducing their
dependency upon the industrial powers
for their ultimate security and, in some
cases, may even be becoming more
dependent as the problems of implementation of very sophisticated
weapons programs compound. Since
most of the emerging military powers in
the less-industrial world are buying U.S.
rather than Soviet equipment, this "dependency" relationship is certainly not
welcomed by the Soviet Union. 1 3
Furthermore, in military terms, the
proliferation of arms to less-industrial
countries may presently be less disadvantageous for the United States than
the Soviet Union for several reasons.
First, the types of naval weapons being
procured by littoral states are generally
low-cost alternatives to traditional
"capital ships" such as SSM-equipped
patrol boats. While having localized advantages due to surprise or geography in
confined waters, they are not likely to
be much of a match against a really
sophisticated capital ship such as an
attack aircraft carrier in open waters.
The Soviet Union, even with limited
air-capable ships like the Kiev, presently
lacks the maritime air and traditional
"capital ships" to counter, in naval
terms, an enraged littoral state unless it
were to deploy a large percentage of its
striking fleet or rely on nonnaval
options. Second, in many cases, the
Soviet Union rather than the United
States is a potential target for growing
littoral naval capabilities, especially for
those small countries who have invested
most heavily in naval systems such as
Israel, Iran, South Africa and Brazil.
Third, although the Soviet Union has

never been reluctant to use force, so far,
its record of forceful or threatened
naval intervention overseas has been
virtually nonexistent. While the United
States may be constrained in future uses
of force, in calculating the probabilities
of intervention against a less-industrial
country, the psychological advantage
may, ironically, favor the United States.
Economic Factors.
• Sea Resource. Both the United
States and the Soviet Union have growing interests in the economic uses of the
seas. At the same time that the West's
conventional military capacity has
diminished, so dependence upon certain
resources, especially oil, has increased
and will continue to increase during the
coming decade. Barring dramatic
changes in consumption patterns there
are no alternatives to oil as the primary
energy source for the next 10-15 years.
Within this period Persian Gulf oil will
remain critical. Any prolonged interference with the transshipment of Persian Gulf oil to Europe and Japan would
have a profound impact upon Western
economic, political and, possibly, military relationships.14 As a consequence,
the security of the oil-flow cycle should
assume great importance for Western
strategic planning. But, if the West's
most serious weakness is oil, the Soviet
Union's is food. Excluding a radical
change in the Soviet method of agriculture and more favorable weather conditions than are currently being forecast
for the next decade, the Soviet Union
will continue to need to purchase
Western food and expand its capacity to
retrieve fish protein from the sea.1 5
Similar Soviet import requirements exist
in the area of technology and the need
for access to Western sources.
The growing demand for sea resources, especially oil and fish, has
already led to conflict and, on occasion,
violence over ownership and exploration
rights. Unfortunately some of the most
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lucrative untapped sea resources-oil
and fish-are located in potential conflict regions. Areas replete with resource
conflict include the South China Sea
where both Chinas, Japan, the Koreas,
Vietnam, and the Philippines have competing claims for numerous offshore
islands and potentially lucrative oil
deposits. Conflict over fish has already
resulted in violent encounters between
the Soviet Union and Japan, North and
South Korea, Britain and Iceland, and
the United States and several South
American states. The Soviet Union and
Japan are especially vulnerable to the
effects of 200 mile exclusive economic
zones since so much of their protein
needs come from the sea.
In sum, it can be anticipated that as
the potential for conflict over sea resources grows, so the need to "protect"
these resources with military or "constabulary" forces will grow. Both the
Soviet Union and the United States may
be separately drawn into future conflicts over the ownership of and access
to sea resources.
• Sea Transportation. The overall
growth in world trade is resulting in an
expansion of seaborne commercial traffic. The security implications of these
trends are potentially very important.
At the most extreme level the West's
growing dependency upon the oil
SLOC's from the Persian Gulf, Alaska,
North Sea, West Africa, Venezuela, and
South East Asia requires much more
attention than it so far has received.
Even though deliberate naval action
against Western SLOC's by the Soviet
Union remains unlikely, the vulnerability of this commerce to boycotts
and cartels, to "closing" of chokepoints
and strategic straits either by attempted
political or other forms of action, and
to third parties or transnational actors
remains a potential problem for both
the industrialized and the resourceexporting states.
In parallel, the growth of the Soviet

commercial fleet has led to speculation
that over time the Soviet Union may be
able to increase its share of seaborne
traffic and thereby challenge or even
negate the capabilities of the Western
operators in their critical field. To offset
the more demonological explanations
for Soviet commercial activity it should
be pointed out that the Soviet's commercial fleet is one of its few foreign
exchange earners. Given the continuing
demand for Western wheat and technology, it can be argued that the Soviet
commercial fleet is an economic necessity. Furthermore, despite its growth,
the fleet is comparatively backwards in
technical terms and unlikely to challenge the U.S. merchant marine in
efficiency or capability. Where the
Soviet Union may have an advantage
over the United States is in the centralization of its commercial maritime planning which undoubtedly has military
capabilities, especially in the areas of
command, control and communications
and intelligence gathering. This does not
assume either monolithic control or
efficiency-but, compared with the
divided and fractured American system,
unless the latter can sort out some of its
problems, the Soviets over the longer
term can erode the American lead in
technology.
IV. Implications for
Policy.

U.S.

Maritime

Policy Options. In view of the
differences in U.S.-Soviet naval missions
and capabilities and the changes in the
worldwide political, military and economic environment, how should the
United States orchestrate its policy and
plan its maritime forces for the next
decade?
The new environment contains
some fundamental paradoxes which
compound the difficulty of choosing a
preferred policy. The economic benefits
of the new ocean regime ratified by a
law of the sea agreement offer the
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potential for a future U.S. bonanza
especially in the areas of oil, mineral
and fish exploitation and maritime
transportation. However, for the next
10 years or so, the Western powers are
becoming more dependent upon the
seas while their control of the seas is
being challenged in certain areas. Soviet
maritime power has been in the ascendancy yet the Soviet Union will face
severe constraints in projecting its
power overseas as well as in the continued modernization of its maritime
forces. The less-industrial world is
modernizing and arming at a remarkable
pace, yet at the same time is becoming
dependent upon the industrial world for
its basic technology. These trends reinforce the interdependence of the
major actors in the international system
at the very time when sources for
military conflict in critical regions of
the world show no signs of abating.
One net effect is to establish much
closer and more complex linkages between various maritime activities in
both a structural and geographical sense.
What this all adds up to is that the
number of contingencies which could
occur in the decades ahead to jeopardize
U.S. interests is growing; yet, for the
United States to adopt unilateral means
of ensuring the protection of all these
interests will almost certainly exceed
diplomatic and financial capabilities.
This suggests that we need to think very
carefully about our maritime interests
and decide which of them we wish to
protect by ourselves; those we wish to
protect in concert with friends and allies
and those we can afford to relinquish or
diminish our dependence upon.
Insofar as the commercial and economic aspects of ,U.S. maritime policy
are concerned, m~h greater coordination is required in Washington if the
very great economic benefits from the
sea are to be realized. The list of
participants with important maritime
interests includes not only fishing, shipbuilding and shipping industries but the

Congress, Labor, the Departments of
Commerce, Interior, and Transport and
the State Department and Department
of Defense, as well as those littoral
states on both U.S. coasts which have
increasing interests in coastal zone
management, which includes pollution
control, fishing and offshore drilling.
Although coordination between the
Executive and Legislative Branches and
the federal and state bureaucracies is
essential, leadership must start in the
Executive Branch. A first step would be
to institute a more balanced representation of the various interests in the
Executive Branch. Establishment of a
new maritime bureaucracy may not be
the solution although some form of
centralization through a single cabinetlevel coordinator-a maritime Czarmight be a distinct improvement.
Understanding the maritime issues and
coordinating the bureaucratic
machinery are the two most significant
requirements and that responsibility resides with the President.
In terms of defense policy the
problems are potentially far more serious, because in this respect they involve
relationships with foreign governments.
With exceptions of the defense of the
North American regions including the
immediate northeastern Pacific and
northwest Atlantic, protection of worldwide maritime interests will have to rely
upon continued and possibly increased
cooperation with friends and allies. The
policy dilemmas are most apparent in
those areas, which up to now, we have
either had complete control over or,
alternatively, have not commanded very
high attention in terms of U.S. strategic
priorities. Of particular importance is
the Northwest Pacific and the Persian
Gulf-Indian Ocean region.
The problem in the Northwest
Pacific is that whereas we have important commitments in Korea, Japan
and the Philippines, the aftermath of
Vietnam has eroded our physical and
psychological capabilities to project
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force in the region. We, therefore, have
the option of either reducing commitments or relying more heavily upon
more subtle diplomatic initiatives and
local friendly countries to provide a
greater share of their defense. This
problem is most acute in the case of
Japan. Logic dictates that Japan should
expand its military capabilities; politics
suggests that this will remain difficult
though not impossible in the years
ahead.
In the Southern Seas16 it would be
most dangerous for the Western Allies
to permit the unilateral growth of the
Soviet maritime capabilities. Any potential on the part of the Soviet Union to
expand its power to the point where it
seriously could threaten Persian Gulf oil
would, over the next decade or so, pose
a great threat to the Western world
which in many ways would be more
divisive than the current Soviet challenge to Western Europe. The relationship between oil and security in the
Middle East is extremely complicated
and does not necessarily lead one to the
conclusion that allied unity is inevitable
in the event of disruption or even threat
to oil supplies.
Given the importance of the Indian
Ocean in addition to the other remaining commitments and requirements that
necessitate the maintenance of a strong
position in the Pacific, Atlantic and
Mediterranean areas, we have several
options to check Soviet power in the
Middle East. Three possibilities should
be examined: First, to have U.S. forces
and facilities in the Indian Ocean
equivalent to those of the Soviets;
second, to reduce our direct military
commitments and rely, instead, on more
indirect policies such as arms transfers
to friendly local powers; third, to rely
on a more subtle approach which plays
upon the Soviet Union's inherently cautious and pragmatic view of its military
relations with the West. This third
. approach could include limited military
options such as further low-keyed

initiatives to secure access to military
facilities in the Indian Ocean. In practical terms this means that our arms
transfer policies to Middle East countries need to be more clearly related to
our overall security requirements. It also
suggests that serious consideration
should be given to the uses of bases in
Australia, possibly Cockburn Sound at
Perth, thus permitting the Seventh Fleet
a "swing" capability from the Pacific
Ocean to the Indian Ocean theaters. A
further option would be to employ
more fully with Britain and France
other islands base options in the general
area of the Southern Seas, especially in
view of potential difficulties with base
rights and facilities in the Persian Gulf,
the Philippines and Southern Africa.
Weapons and Force Structures. In
translating these geopolitical requirements into military missions, force
structures and weapons technology,
priority must be given to sustaining and
improving the capacity to destroy or
neutralize the Soviet Fleet in conventional combat preferably by denying
egress from home waters and destroying
units already at sea. This capability
would automatically assure protection
of SLOC's and maritime interests. This
type of navy wpuld also possess sufficient flexibility and capability to respond to most non-Soviet contingencies
when they arise.
For the 1980's, three approaches
might be pursued. First, the geographic
vulnerability of the Soviet Navy can be
better exploited by current and future
technology in mine warfare and mine
delivery systems. "Captor," an ASW
mine using a MK-46 torpedo is an
excellent, but tardy, step against enemy
submarines. 17 Further mining developments against both submarines and surface warships must be hastened including enhanced capabilities for delivery as close as possible to Soviet naval
bases 18 thereby restricting Soviet movements and permitting U.S. sub-
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marines freedom of action beyond
those close-in minefields_
Secondly, while carrier task forces
will remain the centerpiece of any antiSoviet strategy, several types of additional weapons systems and basing
structures augmenting this essential
offensive capability should be considered. A two-phased research and
development program for new aircapable ships should focus on Surface
Effect Ships (SES) and VSTOL aircraft.
The SES concept, despite extremely
difficult problems of stability, endurance, propulsion, maintenance, and
costs, has great potential. Riding on its
cushion of air at 80-100 knots, the SES
would be capable of one day transits
from the Cape of Good Hope to Diego
Garcia and from Diego Garcia to the
Straits of Hormuz. With advanced weapons and sensors, these ships might be
projected rapidly into distant and
potentially hazardous areas with sufficient capabilities to perform their
missions but without the attendant
costs and risks of deploying an expensive CV. 19
The second weapons program is to
develop VSTOL aircraft having payload,
endurance and performance characteristics roughly equivalent to today's carrier strike aircraft. Admiral Holloway
has already made the case for this
program and the U.S. Navy is actively
pursuing new VSTOL technologies..
These VSTOL could be stationed in
CV's, aboard smaller air-capable ships
such as LHA's and even in larger destroyers providing for the fleet a more
dispersed and efficient air capability.
The research and development program for the next decade also needs to
anticipate the likely future maritime
environment and the requirement for
lower cost, offensively armed surface
escorts with the capacity for extended
independent surveillance missions. This
is in addition to current programs and
not in competition with them. These
relatively inexpensive "killer escorts"

would be designed primarily against
surface ships (and missile-armed patrol
boats), would carry a modest ASW
facility and be powered by a combination gas turbine-diesel system? 0
Continued development of surfaceto-surface missiles is also important.
"Harpoon" is a first step but is limited
in its ability to acquire independently
over-the-horizon targets and perhaps in
the lethality of its approximately
SOO-pound explosive warhead. The
"Tomahawk" submarine-launched
cruise missile (SLCM) incorporates advanced self-contained computer guidance which could have direct application in aiding independent target acquisition capacities against maritime
targets.21 The combination of the
guidance techniques in "Tomahawk"
with a harpoon-type missile, including
new types of shaped explosive warheads, is a weapons development having
excellent application for the fleet.
Thirdly, greater use of air force
systems in sea control/sea denial against
the Soviets should be explored. In this
case, the Soviet example of Long Range
Naval Aviation demonstrates a "balanced force, combined arms" approach.22
Finally, the United States should
explore with its allies ways of imprOving
Western access to base facilities in areas
such as the Mediterranean and Indian
Oceans and the Western Pacific. A combination of carrier task forces, new
VSTOL aircraft and/or SES ships, a
large more modern fleet of oilers and a
forward base structure, perhaps including large, superstable floating concrete platforms might provide greater
flexibility at less cost than either of the
alternatives on its own.

v. Conclusion. Our basic conclusion is
that the United States has the opportunity to reap major benefits from the
emerging maritime environment in the
years ahead but that this will require
some hard decisions concerning
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priorities, especially given the escalating
financial and political costs of maintaining a worldwide maritime presence. If
positive decisions are not made then we
run the risk of losing economic benefits
as well as seeing the naval balance with
the Soviet Union shift against us in
critical areas. We believe that Soviet
maritime power can be checked or
neutralized by the United States and its
allies at an acceptable financial cost,
provided that we fully exploit our
natural geographical and technological
advantages and the other asymmetries in
the maritime environment from which
we benefit.
The practical implications of these
conclusions suggest that we should
articulate a policy which will have the
following results in both the commercial
and military sectors:
• Increase the commercial shipbuilding/capacity for exploiting the fish
and mineral resources of the sea; this
will also benefit the naval shipbuilding
and overhaul programs by providing
new yards.
• Articulate strong sup,port for the
commercial exploitation of the 200-mile

EEZ with due regard for environmental
concerns.
• Exploit our advantages in maritime technology especially in the fields
of electronics for resource detection,
ocean drilling and mining, fish breeding
and management, large superstable
floating concrete platforms.23
• Counter Soviet naval power by
(a) making it increasingly difficult
for the Soviet Union to consider seriously conventional naval missions such
as interdiction of SLOC's.
(b) exploiting Soviet geographic
weaknesses
(c) signaling U.S. resolve in critical
areas such as the Indian Ocean by subtle
and low-key diplomatic and naval
initiatives.
In sum, there is no reason why the
United States should not exploit the
intensive wealth of the new frontier of
the oceans as it was able to exploit its
western borders in the 19th century. To
this extent what is required is a new
order of U.S. maritime policy which, if
properly implemented, can enhance our
security and prosperity in an increasingly competitive world.

NOTES
1. The term "maritime" applies to the broadest uses of the sea including trade, transport
and exploitation of ocean mineral and food resources as well as the more forceful aspects. The
term "naval" applies to a state's use of (military) force in the maritime environment.
2. There have been several government studies including NSSM 125 of April 1971 on
"Oceans Policy." The problem is incorporating these efforts within a broader context of
interested participants of both the private and public sector. In October 1976, former Secretary
of Labor Ussery announced the Ford Administration would shortly form a "cabinet level
maritime coordinator," an event overtaken by the election. This may be a necessary step but, as
argued below, more is required in order to produce a cogent set of policies.
3. In Naval Strategy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1910) Alfred Thayer Mahan amended his
previous impressions that navies depend upon maritime commerce as the cause and justification
of their existence. He went on to note:
.•. but it has become perfectly evident by concrete example, that a navy may be
necessary where there is no shipping.... More and more it becomes clear, that the
functions of navies are distinctly military and international, whatever their historical origin
in particular cases [page 446].
4. Britain has four "Polaris"-type SSBN's each armed with 16 A·3 Polaris missiles. Each
A-3 missile has three 200KT warheads. The French have four "SSBS" SSBN's each with 16
missiles for a combined U.K./French total of 128 missiles and 256 reentry vehicles/warheads.
Assuming one British and one French SSBN always on station, there is the capability of
threatening the destruction of Moscow and Leningrad.
5. Bureaucratically, the Navy has been and remains "junior partner" to the other Services.
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6. The carrier is far easier to detect than the SSBN and can also be "marked" or trailed by
a following ship, airplane, submarine or satellite.
7. In addition to the differences in missions, geography provides two important
asymmetries. First, while the United States has virtually unrestricted use of her Atlantic and
Pacific coastal naval bases, the Soviets have four distant and nonsupporting fleets hampered by
weather and difficulty of egress. The four fleets, Northern (Kola,Murmansk), Baltic (Riga,
Leningrad), Black Sea, and Pacific (Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk) are isolated and hampered by
climate. Egress from the Northern and Pacific bases requires a long transit before reaching deep
water for submarines and lengthy ones to likely areas of action. Passage from the Baltic and Black
Seas to open water (Atlantic and Mediterranean) is extremely hazardous and, in time of war, these
seas would most likely be bottled up. Second, in terms of SSBN operations, the Barents Sea may
provide a natural sanctuary for protection of Soviet submarines, because of its contour, depth,
proximity to Russia and climate. A similar geographic sanctuary is an asset the United States
lacks.
8. Elmo Zumwalt, On Watch (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), chap. 4.
9. Norman Polmar, "Soviet ASW," Naval Review, July 1976.
1 O. Further evidence in the form of enhanced conventional capabilities of the Soviet ground
and air forces is used to document this trend.
11. By examining all types of Soviet construction programs including the newest classes
such as the Kiev air-capable ships, the Kara-class guided-missile cruisers and the "D" SSBN's, an
analyst can evaluate capabilities and, by deduction, discern likely missions. Michael K. MccGwire
has been the leader in this field and his findings generally support the strategic nuclear defensive
interpretation of Soviet naval motives.
12. The lengthy series in Morskoi sbornik, "Navies in War and in Peace," is well-known.
Gorshkov's latest book is The Sea Power of the State (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976). In this book,
Gorshkov makes more explicit his arguments for naval use stressing the strategic nuclear
requirements as well as the potential for political uses short of applying actual force. Gorshkov
calls for a balanced maritime effort based, of course, on naval power.
13. Iran is one obvious example whose enhanced military power and links with the United
States are matters of some military concern to the Soviet Union.
14. One current oil thesis is: (1) By 1985-1990 U.S. oil imports will be equal to that of
Europe and Japan; (2) in the same period, the Soviet Union will be seeking external oil sources;
(3) given a reluctance by OPEC, particularly AOPEC, to increase production because of finite oil
supplies and with no alternative economic infrastructures built within those oil-rich states, the
conflict over satisfying demand could reach crisis proportions.
15. An argument can be made which suggests the Soviet Union is attempting to shift diet
protein requirements from fish to meat sources. The importation of U.S. grain for animal fodder
and not human consumption is cited as an indication of Soviet intent. While this argument may
reflect Soviet normative objectives, it is superficial and misleading for several reasons. First, the
Soviets have always attempted the enhancing of beef and pork production since the revolution.
But the constraint is their system of agriculture which without major restructuring, is unlikely to
sustain much higher rates of meat production. Second, based on allocation of resources made in
the lOth Five-Year Plan, the fishing industry is continuing at a significant level of importance.
Third, the traditional demand for fish (both fresh and salt water) as part of the standard diet is
not likely to change even over the longer term. Last, the Soviets are unlikely to develop further
dependencies on Western food for enhancing a single source of protein supply (pork and beef).
Thus, every indication suggests a continuing and, possibly, increasing reliance on fish as sources
of protein.
16. The "Southern Seas" include: the Southern Indian Ocean, the Cape of Good Hope, and
the South Atlantic.
17. This type of mine is actuated by the sound of an approaching submarine and the MK-46
torpedo fired at the target. The kill probabilities of this system are quite good.
18. Existing delivery systems such as U.S. Navy attack aircraft and B-52 bombers are not
satisfactory since they are nuclear-capable and, in closing the Soviet coast, would probably be so
interpreted. Remotely piloted vehicles, rocket-assisted delivery systems of 100-mile range and
submarine delivery are feasible options.
19. The SES would be armed with cruise missiles and aircraft like the F-14 and newer
generations of VSTOL. This would provide excellent capabilities and at less cost than CV's.
However, one should not underestimate the potential magnitude of the development and design
problems. But the potential that SES demonstrates strongly suggests further R&D.
20. Prototypes of this ship are the Vosper-Thorneycraft Mark 7, British type 21 and Italian
"Lobo"-class escorts. About 320 to 400 feet in length and 3,000 tons displacement, these ships
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would have speeds in excess of 35 knots. Limited endurance at speed and high noise levels
associated with diesel engines reduce ASW effectiveness. An austere command and control
system, similar to British systems now in service, would further reduce costs. Gun armament
should include at least one lightweight 5-inch mount. Antiair protection would come from these
guns, from rapid firing "close-in-weapons" systems such as "Phalanx," speed, maneuverability
and electronics decoys like "chaff." The Israeli Navy in the October 1973 War demonstrated the
effectiveness of these capabilities against cruise missile attack. Longer range ASW torpedoes
(MK-46) would complement medium-powered hall-mount variable-depth sonars. Smaller versions
of these escorts (245 feet in length) are already being built for the Saudi's in this country.
21. The problems with "Tomahawk" are interrelated with SALT (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks) and the 2,OOO-nautical-mile range potential of the SLCM which is seen by the Soviets
as a great potential threat.
22. Space precludes discussion of other recommendations. Specifically, development of new
electronics warfare and advanced surveillance systems represent an ongoing requirement.
Maritime aircraft such as the p-3e and S-3 "Viking" are vital to ASW. The submarine fleet, too,
may have untapped potential including the possibility of commissioning a new class of fast attack
nonnuclear submarines (or recommissioning those in reserve). While these submarines lack the
performance characteristics of their nuclear sisters, they may be cheaper over the long term and
are less manpower-intensive given the rigorous nuclear power training requirements.
23. One obvious application of these platforms is for power production since the sea offers
unlimited potential for cold-water cooling.

- - - - tfi-----

